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Abstract
We investigate the role of quantum mechanical effects in the central
stability concept of evolutionary game theory i.e. an Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (ESS). Using two and three-player symmetric quantum games we
show how the presence of quantum phenomenon of entanglement can be
crucial to decide the course of evolutionary dynamics in a population of
interacting individuals.
1 Introduction
Many interesting results in the recently developed quantum game theory [1, 2,
3, 4] are about the most fundamental idea in noncooperative game theory [5]
i.e. the Nash equilibrium (NE). A strategy profile is a NE [6] if no player can
gain by unilaterally deviating from it. The implicit assumption behind NE is
that players make their choices simultaneously and independently. This idea
also assumes that each player participating in a game behaves rational and
searches to maximize his own payoff. In situations where evolution of complex
behavior occurs further refinements of NE concept are required [7], especially,
when multiple NE appear in the analysis of a game. A refinement is then needed
to prefer some NE over the others. Due attention has already been given to NE
in the recent works [2, 4] on quantum games and this development has motivated
us to study certain refinement notions of NE in quantum games. Refinements
of NE in classical game theory are popular as well as numerous [8]. Speaking
historically, the set of refinements became so large that eventually almost any
NE could be justified in terms of someone or other’s refinement [7].
An interesting, and fruitful as well, refinement of NE was introduced by
Maynard Smith in 1970’s that became the central notion of evolutionary game
theory. In his book Evolution and the Theory of Games [9] he diverted attention
away from elaborate definitions of rationality and presented an evolutionary ap-
proach in classical game theory. The evolutionary approach can be seen as a
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large population model of adjustment to a NE i.e. an adjustment of popula-
tion segments by evolution as opposed to learning. Contrary to classical game
theory, in evolutionary game theory the individuals of a population, subject to
evolution, are not assumed to act consciously and rationally. Many successful
applications of evolutionary game theory appeared in mathematical biology to
predict the behavior of bacteria and insects that can hardly be said to think at
all. The most important feature of evolutionary game theory is that the assump-
tion of rational players, originating from classical game theory, does not remain
crucial. This important aspect appears when players’ payoffs are equated to
their reproductive success.
The concept of evolutionary stability stimulated the development of evolu-
tionary game theory that establishes a link between game theory and the theory
of evolution. Presently the ESS theory is the central model of evolutionary dy-
namics of a populations of interacting individuals. It asks, and finds answer
to it, a basic question: which states, during the course of selection process, of
a given population are stable against perturbations induced by mutations [10].
The ESS theory is based on Darwin’s idea of natural selection; which is shown
to be describable as an algorithm called replicator dynamic [7]. Iterations of
selections from randomly mutating replicators is an important feature of the
dynamic. Speaking the language of game theory, the replicator dynamic says
that in a population the proportion of players which play better strategies in-
crease with time. When replicator dynamic is underlying process of a game the
ESSs are shown to be stable against perturbations [10]. In other words ESSs
are, then, rest points of the replicator dynamic.
Recent developments in quantum games provide an incentive to look at the
mathematical theory of evolution, with the central idea of an ESS, in a broader
picture given by Hilbert structure of strategy space in the new theory. This
incentive is driven by a question: how game-theoretical models, of evolutionary
dynamics in a population, shape themselves in the new settings provided to the
game theory recently by quantum mechanics? Our motivation is that quan-
tum mechanical effects, especially entanglement, may have decisive role in the
evolutionary dynamics that have already been successfully, and also quite rigor-
ously, modelled using the classical game theory. To study evolution in quantum
settings we have chosen the ESS idea mostly for simplicity and beauty of the
concept. We ask questions like, how ESSs are affected when a classical game
played in a population changes itself to one of its quantum forms? How pure and
mixed ESSs are distinguished from one another when such a change in form of a
game takes place? And most importantly, how evolutionary dynamics becomes
linked to quantum entanglement present in games that are played in quantum
settings?
In earlier papers [11, 12, 13] we showed that the presence of entanglement,
in asymmetric as well as symmetric bimatrix games, can disturb the evolution-
ary stability expressed by the idea of ESS. So that, evolutionary stability of
a symmetric NE can be made to appear or disappear by controlling entangle-
ment in symmetric and asymmetric bimatrix games. We found a consideration
of symmetric games more appropriate because the notion of an ESS was origi-
2
nally investigated [9] for pair-wise symmetric contests. In present letter we find
examples of two and three-player games where entanglement changes evolution-
ary stability of a symmetric NE. We assume initial quantum states in the same,
originally suggested, simpler form presented in the scheme [3] that tells how
to play a quantum game. With initial states in this form, we show that two
and three-player games are distinguished in an interesting aspect i.e. entangle-
ment can change evolutionary stability of pure strategies in two-player games.
However, for a mixed strategy it can be done when the number of players are in-
creased from two to three. Before coming to quantum settings we first describe,
mathematically, the concept of an ESS in classical evolutionary game theory.
2 Evolutionary stability
Maynard Smith introduced the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)
in a seminal paper ‘The logic of animal conflict’ [14]. In rough terms, an ESS
is a strategy which, if played by almost all members of a population, cannot be
displaced by a small invading group playing any alternative strategy. Suppose
pairs of individuals are repeatedly drawn at random from a large population to
play a symmetric two-person game. Let the game between the individuals be a
symmetric bimatrix game represented by the expression G = (M,MT ) whereM
represents the payoff matrix and T its transpose. In usual notation P (x, y) gives
the payoff to a x-player against a y-player for a symmetric pair-wise contest.
A strategy x is said to be an ESS if for each mutant strategy y there exists a
positive invasion barrier such that if the population share of individuals playing
the mutant strategy y falls below this barrier, then x earns a higher expected
payoff than y. Mathematically speaking, x is an ESS when for each strategy
y 6= x the inequality P [x, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] > P [y, (1− ǫ)x+ ǫy] should hold for all
sufficiently small ǫ > 0; where, for example, the expression on the left-hand side
is payoff to strategy x when played against the mixed strategy (1−ǫ)x+ǫy. This
condition for an ESS can be shown [9] easily to be equivalent to the following
two requirements
1. P (x, x) > P (y, x)
2. If P (x, x) = P (y, x) then P (x, y) > P (y, y) (1)
It becomes apparent that an ESS is a symmetric NE but also possesses a
stability property against mutations. Condition 1 in the above definition shows
that (x, x) is a NE for the bimatrix game G = (M,MT ) if x is an ESS. However,
the reverse is not true. If (x, x) is a NE, then x is an ESS only if x satisfies
condition 2 in the definition (1). The ESS condition gives a refinement on the set
of symmetric Nash equilibria [7]. Its essential feature is that, apart from being
a symmetric NE, it is robust against a small number of mutants appearing in a
population playing an ESS [10].
Now we consider quantum settings, involving two players, to investigate the
concept of evolutionary stability.
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3 Two-player case
We use the quantization scheme suggested by Marinatto and Weber [3] for the
two-player quantum game of Battle of Sexes. In this scheme the players’ tac-
tics consist of deciding the classical probabilities of applying two unitary and
Hermitian operators (the identity I and the inversion operator C) on an ini-
tial quantum strategy in 2⊗ 2 dimensional Hilbert space; that can be obtained
from a system of two qubits. The tactics phase is similar to probabilistic choice
between pure strategies in the classical game theory. Interestingly, the classical
form of the game is reproduced by making the initial quantum state unentangled
[3]. There are some different opinions [15, 16] concerning the use of the term
strategy in Marinatto and Weber’s scheme. Earlier Eisert, Wilkins, and Lewen-
stein proposed a scheme [2] where choosing a move corresponds to a strategy.
Expanding on this work, Marinatto and Weber presented a different approach
and preferred to call tactics the process of choosing a move when an initial
strategy, in the form of a quantum state, is forwarded to the players. In this
paper we will refer to Marinatto and Weber’s tactics as strategies or moves and
their initial strategy as initial quantum state. We then find how entanglement
affects evolutionary stability in the circumstances that a quantum version of a
game can be reduced to its classical form by removing entanglement. Because
the classical game corresponds to an unentangled initial quantum state, a com-
parison between ESSs in classical and quantized versions of the game can be
made by maneuvering the initial quantum state, in some particular form. The
scheme for two-player quantum game is shown in fig. 1.
Consider a two-player symmetric game given by the matrix
Alice′s strategy
Bob’s strategy
S1 S2
S1 (α, α) (β, γ)
S2 (γ, β) (δ, δ)
(2)
and played via the initial state |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉 + b |S2S2〉 where |a|2 + |b|2 =
1. A unitary and Hermitian operator C used in the scheme is defined as [3]
C |S1〉 = |S2〉, C |S2〉 = |S1〉 and C† = C = C−1. Let one of the players chooses
his strategy by implementing the identity operator I with probability p and the
operator C with probability (1− p), on the initial state ρin that corresponds to
|ψin〉. Similarly, suppose the second player applies the operators I and C with
probabilities q and (1 − q) respectively. The final density matrix is written as
[3]
ρfin =
∑
U=I,C
Pr(UA) Pr(UB)[UA ⊗ UBρinU †A ⊗ U †B] (3)
where the unitary and Hermitian operator U is either I or C. Pr(UA), Pr(UB)
are the probabilities with which players A and B apply the operator U on
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Figure 1: The scheme to play a two-player quantum game.
the initial state, respectively. It is seen that ρfin corresponds to a convex
combination of all possible quantum operations. Payoff operators for Alice and
Bob are [3]
(PA,B)oper = α, α |S1S1〉+ β, γ |S1S2〉+ γ, β |S2S1〉+ δ, δ |S2S2〉
The payoffs are then obtained as mean values of these operators i.e. PA,B =
Tr
[
(PA,B)operρfin
]
. Because the quantum game is symmetric using the initial
state |ψin〉 and the payoff matrix (2), there is no need for subscripts. We,
therefore, write the payoff to a p player against a q player as P (p, q). When
⋆
p
is a NE we find the following payoff difference [12]
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[ |a|2 (β − δ) +
|b|2 (γ − α)− ⋆p {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} ] (4)
Now the ESS conditions for the pure strategy p = 0 are given as
1. |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} > (β − δ)
2. If |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} = (β − δ)
then q2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0 (5)
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where 1 is the NE condition. Similarly the ESS conditions for the pure strategy
p = 1 are
1. |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} > (γ − α)
2. If |b|2 {(γ − α)− (β − δ)} = (γ − α)
then (1 − q)2 {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0 (6)
Because these conditions for both the pure strategies p = 1 and p = 0 depend on
|b|2, therefore, there can be examples of two-player symmetric games for which
the evolutionary stability of pure strategies can be changed while playing the
game using initial state in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+b |S2S2〉. However, for the
mixed NE, given as
⋆
p = |a|
2(β−δ)+|b|2(γ−α)
(β−δ)+(γ−α) , the corresponding payoff difference
4 becomes identically zero. From the second condition of an ESS we find, for
the mixed NE
⋆
p, the difference
P (
⋆
p, q)− P (q, q) = 1
(β − δ) + (γ − α) ×
[(β − δ)− q {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} − |b|2 {(β − δ)− (γ − α)} ]2 (7)
Therefore, the mixed strategy
⋆
p is an ESS when {(β − δ) + (γ − α)} > 0. This
condition, making the mixed NE
⋆
p an ESS, is independent of |b|2 [17]. So that,
in this symmetric two-player quantum game, evolutionary stability of the mixed
NE
⋆
p can not be changed when the game is played using initial quantum states
of the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1〉+ b |S2S2〉.
Therefore, evolutionary stability of only the pure strategies can be affected,
with the chosen form of the initial states, for the two-player symmetric games.
Examples of the games with this property are easy to find. The class of games
for which γ = α and (β − δ) < 0 the strategies p = 0 and p = 1 remain NE
for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]; but the strategy p = 1 is not an ESS when |b|2 = 0 and the
strategy p = 0 is not an ESS when |b|2 = 1. In an earlier letter [12] we found an
example of a class of games for which a pure strategy, that is an ESS classically,
does not remain ESS for a particular value of |b|2,even though it remains a NE
for all possible range of |b|2.
To find examples of symmetric quantum games, where evolutionary stability
of the mixed strategies may also be affected by controlling the entanglement,
we now increase the number of players from two to three.
4 Three-player case
In extending the two-player scheme to a three-player case, we assume that three
players A,B, and C play their strategies by applying the identity operator I
with the probabilities p, q and r respectively on the initial state |ψin〉. Therefore,
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they apply the operator C with the probabilities (1 − p), (1 − q) and (1 − r)
respectively. The final state then corresponds to the density matrix
ρfin =
∑
U=I,C
Pr(UA) Pr(UB) Pr(UC)
[
UA ⊗ UB ⊗ UCρinU †A ⊗ U †B ⊗ U †C
]
(8)
where the 8 basis vectors are |SiSjSk〉, for i, j, k = 1, 2. Again we use initial
quantum state in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉+b |S2S2S2〉, where |a|2+ |b|2 = 1.
It is a quantum state in 2⊗2⊗2 dimensional Hilbert space that can be prepared
from a system of three two-state quantum systems or qubits. Similar to the two-
player case, we define the payoff operators for the players A, B, and C as
(PA,B,C)oper =
α1, β1, η1 |S1S1S1〉 〈S1S1S1|+ α2, β2, η2 |S2S1S1〉 〈S2S1S1|+
α3, β3, η3 |S1S2S1〉 〈S1S2S1|+ α4, β4, η4 |S1S1S2〉 〈S1S1S2|+
α5, β5, η5 |S1S2S2〉 〈S1S2S2|+ α6, β6, η6 |S2S1S2〉 〈S2S1S2|+
α7, β7, η7 |S2S2S1〉 〈S2S2S1|+ α8, β8, η8 |S2S2S2〉 〈S2S2S2| (9)
where αl, βl, ηl for 1 ≤ l ≤ 8 are 24 constants of the matrix of this three-player
game. Payoffs to the players A,B, and C are then obtained as mean values of
these operators
PA,B,C(p, q, r) = Trace
[
(PA,B,C)operρfin
]
(10)
Here, similar to two player case, the classical payoffs can be obtained by making
the initial quantum state unentangled and fixing |b|2 = 0. To get a symmetric
game we define PA(x, y, z) as the payoff to player A when players A, B, and C
play the strategies x,y and z respectively. Following relations make payoffs to
the players a quantity that is identity independent but depends only on their
strategies
PA(x, y, z) = PA(x, z, y) = PB(y, x, z)
= PB(z, x, y) = PC(y, z, x) = PC(z, y, x) (11)
For these relations to hold we need following replacements for βi and ηi
β1 → α1 β2 → α3 β3 → α2 β4 → α3
β5 → α6 β6 → α5 β7 → α6 β8 → α8
η1 → α1 η2 → α3 η3 → α3 η4 → α2
η5 → α6 η6 → α6 η7 → α5 η8 → α8 (12)
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Also, it is now necessary that we should have α6 = α7 and α3 = α4. A symmetric
game between three players, therefore, can be defined by only six constants.
We take these to be α1, α2, α3, α5, α6 and, α8. The payoff to a player now
becomes only a strategy dependent quantity and becomes identity independent.
No subscripts are therefore, needed. Payoff to a p player, when other two players
play q and r, can now be written as P (p, q, r). A symmetric NE
⋆
p can be found
from the Nash condition P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) ≥ 0 i.e.
P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p)− P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) = (⋆p− p)[⋆p2(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η) +
2
⋆
p
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
] ≥ 0 (13)
where (α1−α2) = σ, (α3−α6) = η, and (α5−α8) = ω. Three possible NE are
found as
{⋆p1 = {(ω−η)−|b|2(σ+ω−2η)}±
√
{(σ+ω)2−(2η)2}|b|2(1−|b|2)+(η2−σω)
(1−2|b|2)(σ+ω−2η)
⋆
p2 = 0
⋆
p3 = 1
}
(14)
Clearly the mixed NE
⋆
p1 makes the difference P (
⋆
p,
⋆
p,
⋆
p) − P (p, ⋆p, ⋆p) identically
zero and two values for
⋆
p1 can be found for a given |b|2.
⋆
p2,
⋆
p3are pure strategy
NE. We notice that
⋆
p1 comes out as a NE without imposing further restrictions
on the matrix of the symmetric three-player game. However, the pure strategies
⋆
p2and
⋆
p3can be NE when further restriction are imposed on the matrix of the
game. For example,
⋆
p3can be a NE provided σ ≥ (ω+ σ) |b|2 for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly
⋆
p2can be NE when ω ≤ (ω + σ) |b|2.
Now the question we ask: how the evolutionary stability of these three NE
can be affected while playing the game via the initial quantum states given
in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉 + b |S2S2S2〉?. For the two-player asymmetric
game of Battle of Sexes we showed that out of the three NE only two can be
evolutionarily stable [11]. In classical evolutionary game theory the concept of
an ESS is well known to be extended to multi-player case. When mutants are
allowed to play only one strategy the definition of an ESS for three-player case
is written as [18]
1. P (p, p, p) > P (q, p, p)
2. If P (p, p, p) = P (q, p, p) then P (p, q, p) > P (q, q, p) (15)
Here p is a NE if it satisfies the condition 1 against all q 6= p. For our case the
ESS conditions for the pure strategies
⋆
p2and
⋆
p3 can be written as follows. For
example,
⋆
p2 = 0 is an ESS when
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1. σ |b|2 > ω |a|2
2. If σ |b|2 = ω |a|2 then − ηq2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (16)
where 1 is NE condition for the strategy
⋆
p2 = 0. Similarly
⋆
p3 = 1 is an ESS [19]
when
1. σ |a|2 > ω |b|2
2. If σ |a|2 = ω |b|2 then η(1− q)2(|a|2 − |b|2) > 0 (17)
and both the pure strategies
⋆
p2and
⋆
p3 are ESSs when |a|2 = |b|2. Examples of
three-player symmetric games are easy to find for which a pure strategy is a NE
for the whole range |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], but does not remain an ESS for some particular
value of |b|2. An example of a class of such games is for which σ = 0, ω < 0 and
η ≤ 0. In this class the strategy ⋆p2 = 0 is a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an
ESS when |b|2 = 1.
However, the mixed strategy NE
⋆
p1 forms the most interesting case. It
makes the payoff difference P (
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1,
⋆
p1)− P (p, ⋆p1, ⋆p1) identically zero for every
strategy p. Now
⋆
p1 is an ESS when
{
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
}
> 0 but
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1)
= ±( ⋆p1 − q)2
√
{(σ + ω)2 − (2η)2} |b|2 (1 − |b|2) + (η2 − σω) (18)
Therefore, out of the two possible roots (
⋆
p1)1 and (
⋆
p1)2, that make the difference
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1) − P (q, q, ⋆p1) greater than and less than zero respectively, of the
quadratic equation
⋆
p1
2
(1− 2 |b|2)(σ + ω − 2η) +
2
⋆
p1
{
|b|2 (σ + ω − 2η)− ω + η
}
+
{
ω − |b|2 (σ + ω)
}
= 0 (19)
only (
⋆
p1)1 can exist as an ESS. When the square root term in the equation
(18) becomes zero we have only one mixed NE, that is not an ESS. Therefore,
out of four possible NE in this three-player game only three can be ESSs. An
interesting class of three-player games is one with η2 = σω. For these games the
mixed NE are
⋆
p1 =
{(w−η)−|b|2(σ+ω−2η)}±|a||b||σ−ω|
(1−2|b|2)(σ+ω−2η)
and, when played classically,
we can get only one mixed NE that is not an ESS. However for all |b|2, different
from zero, we generally obtain two NE out of which one can be an ESS.
Similar to the two-player case, the NE in a three-player symmetric game
important from the point of view of evolutionary stability are those that survive
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a change between two initial states; one being unentangled corresponding to the
classical game. Suppose
⋆
p1 remains a NE for |b|2 = 0 and some other non-zero
|b|2. It is possible when (σ−ω)(2 ⋆p1−1) = 0. One possibility is the strategy ⋆p = 12
remaining a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1]. It reduces the defining quadratic equation
for
⋆
p1 to σ + ω + 2η = 0 and makes the difference P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1) − P (q, q, ⋆p1)
independent of |b|2. Therefore the strategy ⋆p = 12 , even when remaining a NE
for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1], can not be an ESS in only one version of the symmetric
three-player game. For the second possibility σ = ω the defining equation for
⋆
p1is reduced to
(1− 2 |b|2)
{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ)−
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}{
⋆
p1 − (η − σ) +
√
η2 − σ2
2(η − σ)
}
= 0
(20)
for which
P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)− P (q, q, ⋆p1) = ±2( ⋆p1 − q)2
∣∣∣∣|b|2 − 12
∣∣∣∣√η2 − σ2 (21)
Here the difference P (
⋆
p1, q,
⋆
p1)−P (q, q, ⋆p1) still depends on |b|2 and becomes zero
for |b|2 = 12 . Therefore for the class of games for which σ = ω and η > σ, one of
the mixed strategies (
⋆
p1)1, (
⋆
p1)2 remains a NE for all |b|2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an ESS
when |b|2 = 12 . In this class of three-player quantum games the evolutionary
stability of a mixed strategy can, therefore, be changed while the game is played
using initial quantum states in the form |ψin〉 = a |S1S1S1〉+ b |S2S2S2〉.
5 Discussion
The fact that classical games are played in natural macroscopic world is well
known for a long time. Evolutionary game theory is a subject, growing out
of such studies and, dealing mostly with games played in the animal world.
Recent work in biology [20] suggests nature playing classical games at micro-
level. Bacterial infections by viruses have been presented as classical game-like
situations where nature prefers the dominant strategies. The concept of evo-
lutionary stability, without assuming rational and conscious individuals, gives
game-theoretical models of stable states for a population of interacting indi-
viduals. Darwinian idea of natural selection provides physical ground to these
models of rationality studied in evolutionary game theory. Why there is need
to study evolutionary stability in quantum games? We find it interesting that
some entirely quantum aspect like entanglement can have a deciding role about
which stable states of the population should survive and others should not.
It means that the presence of quantum interactions, in a population undergo-
ing evolution, can alter its stable states resulting from evolutionary dynamics.
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When entanglement decides the evolutionary outcomes, the role for quantum
mechanics clearly increases from just keeping atoms together that constitute
molecules. This new role may now also include to define and maintain com-
plexity emerging from quantum interactions among a collection of molecules. It
becomes even more interesting with reference to the example of equilibrium in
a mixture of chemicals presented above. When quantum nature of molecular
interactions decides the equilibria that the mixture of Schuster et al. [21] should
be able to attain, there is a clear possibility for the quantum mechanical role in
the models of self-organization in matter and the evolution of macromolecules
before the advent of life.
We have two suggestions where this finding, about quantum effects decid-
ing evolutionary outcomes in a population of interacting entities, can have a
relevance
5.1 Genetic code evolution
The genetic code is the relationship between the sequence of the bases in the
DNA and the sequence of amino acids in proteins. Recent work [22] about
evolvability of the genetic code suggests that the code, like all other features
of organisms, was shaped by natural selection. The question about the pro-
cess and evolutionary mechanism by which the genetic code was optimized is
still unanswered. Two major suggested possibilities are (a). A large number of
codes existed out of which the adaptive one was selected. (b). Adaptive and
error-minimizing constraints gave rise to an adaptive code via code expansion
and simplification. The second possibility of code expansion from earlier simpler
forms is now thought to be supported by much empirical and genetic evidence
[23] and results suggest that the present genetic code was strongly influenced by
natural selection for error minimization. Recently Patel [24] suggested quantum
dynamics played a role in the DNA replication and the optimization criteria in-
volved in genetic information processing. He considers the criteria involved as
a task similar to an unsorted assembly operation where the Grover’s database
search algorithm [25] fruitfully applies; given the different optimal solutions for
classical and quantum dynamics. The assumption underlying this approach, as
we understood it, is that an adaptive code was selected out of a large num-
bers that existed earlier. Recent suggestions about natural selection being the
process for error minimization in the mechanism of adaptive code evolution
suggests, instead, an evolutionary approach for this optimization problem. We
suggest that, in the evolution and expansion of the code from its earlier sim-
pler forms, quantum dynamics too has played important role. The mechanism,
however, leading now to this optimization will be completely different. Our
result that stable outcomes, of an evolutionary process based on natural selec-
tion, depend on presence or absence of quantum entanglement clearly implies
the possibility that other quantum interactions may also have deciding role in
obtaining some optimal outcome of evolution for a system of molecules consti-
tuting a population. The mathematically rigorous representation of stability in
an evolutionary dynamics, based on Darwinian selection, is the concept of an
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ESS. We believe that the code optimization is a problem having close similari-
ties with the problem of evolutionary stability. By showing that entanglement
can bring or take away evolutionary stability from a symmetric NE we have in-
dicated that the code optimization was probably achieved by forces and effects
that were quantum mechanical in nature.
5.2 Quantum evolutionary algorithms
A polynomial time algorithm that can solve an NP problem is not known yet. A
viable alternative approach, shown to find acceptable solutions within a reason-
able time period, is the evolutionary search [26]. Iteration of selection based on
competition, random variation usually called mutation, and exploration of the
fitness landscape of possible solutions are the basic ingredients of many distinct
paradigms of evolutionary computing [27]. On the other hand superposition of
all possible solution states, unitary operator exploiting interference to enhance
the amplitude of the desired states, and final measurement extracting the so-
lution are the components of quantum computing. These two approaches in
computing are believed to represent different philosophies [28]. Finding ESSs
can be easily formulated as an evolutionary algorithm with mutations occurring
within only a small proportion of the total population. In fact ESSs also con-
stitute an important technique in evolutionary computation. Our proposal that
entanglement has a role in the theory of ESSs suggests that the two philosophies,
considered different, may have some common grounds that possibly unites them.
It also hints the possibility of other evolutionary algorithms that utilize or even
exploit quantum effects. In an evolutionary algorithm, exploiting quantum ef-
fects, we may have, for example, fitness functions depending on the amount of
entanglement present. The interesting question then is: how the population will
evolve towards a solution or an equilibrium in relation to the entanglement?
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the idea of evolutionary stability, the central
stability concept of evolutionary game theory, can be related to quantum entan-
glement. We investigated ESSs in three-player quantum games and compared
them to two-player games played by a proposed scheme where two, Hermitian
and unitary, operators are applied on an initial quantum state with classical
probabilities. We used the initial quantum state in the same form proposed by
Marinatto and Weber [3]. In two-player symmetric games we found that evolu-
tionary stability of a mixed strategy can not be changed by a unitary maneuver
of the initial quantum state. However, for a class of three-player symmetric
games it becomes possible to do so. It shows that the presence of quantum
mechanical effects may have a deciding role on the outcomes of evolutionary
dynamics in a population of interacting entities. We suggested that a relevance
of these ideas may be found, for example, in the studies of the evolution of
genetic code at the dawn of life. Another suggestion is designing evolutionary
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algorithms where interactions between individual of a population are governed
by quantum effects. The nature of these quantum effects, influencing the course
of evolution, will also determine the evolutionary outcome. Quantum mechan-
ics playing a role in the theory of ESSs implies that Darwin’s idea of natural
selection has a relevance even for quantum systems.
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